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FOREWORD
This report presents the results of subtask 3 of Study 2.1,
Operations Analysis. This subtask has as its primary objective the
investigation of software costs related to Shuttle upper stage operations
with emphasis on the additional costs attributable to space servicing.
The increased complexity of automated space servicing, beyond current
development and recurring costs could be excessively high.
Historically, software development efforts for space programs
have been difficult to scope. This has been due in part to the lack of
firm requirements at the outset, resulting in numerous unscheduled
revisions and retest cycles. This report addresses this problem as well
as several other factors which influence the ability to predict software
costs for the Shuttle upper stage.
Specific interest is directed at the additional cost and com-
plexities associated with space servicing of automated payloads by the upper
stage in a preprogrammed mode. Consideration is also given to manned
interactive support at the Mission Control Center and the associated impact
this would have on software design and cost.
This subtask of Study 2.1 represents approximately 10% of the
total effort. Companion reports are being published on other subtasks and
a final report will be published at the end of the contract period. Study 2.1
is one of three study tasks being conducted under NASA Contract NASW-
2575 in FY 1974. The NASA study director is Mr. V. N. Huff, NASA Head-
quarters. Code MTE.
One caution should be observed. The results of any task such
as this are highly dependent upon the initial set of ground rules and assump-
tions. The Shuttle upper stage operational concept assumed for this effort
is based upon the experience gained from existing USAF programs and as
such provides a rational basis for estimating software requirements. Other
concepts, such as manned space operations, may result in different require-
ments.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Space servicing of automated satellites offers the possibility of
reducing future space program expenditures through improved utilization
of the Shuttle and a reduction in payload procurement costs. Satellites may
be serviced on orbit by removing failed or expended modules and replacing
these with operational units. This function, when performed by the Shuttle
upper stage, can be completely preprogrammed prior to liftoff. In addition,
upper stage operations may involve servicing of several satellites on any one
flight. One of the principal concerns is that the increased complexity of
space servicing relative to current space operations could result in excessive
upper stage software costs. This involves not only software development for
spaceborne and ground systems but the recurring costs of maintaining the
software system as well. Therefore, this subtask of Operations Analysis
(Study 2. 1) has as its primary objective .the investigation of software costs
related to Shuttle upper stage operations with emphasis on the additional costs
attributable to space servicing.
The problem of attempting to estimate software costs for future
programs is well known in nearly every field of design and development.
Software is notoriously difficult to control and invariably overruns cost
projections and scheduled delivery dates. Although this has occurred
repeatedly, the one saving grace to date has been that the software cost,
even with overruns, is a small percentage of the total design and develop-
ment program involved. Therefore, unless the overrun is substantial, it
may be absorbed without serious impact on the program. However, it is
reasonable to expect software development for future programs to require
a larger percentage of the budget for two reasons: (1) the number and
complexity of functions to be computerized are increasing dramatically,
thereby driving software costs up and (2) computer hardware costs continue
to decrease, emphasizing the higher percentage of budget required for
software. The additional complexity associated with space servicing
functions, therefore, is a rational cause for concern.
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The following questions are fundamental to the problem of
estimating software costs:
a. What key parameters are involved with software costs ?
b. Do sufficient historical data exist as a basis for
extrapolation to the future ?
c. What elements of the basic software development effort
are applicable to servicing functions ?
d. How complex is servicing compared to current satellite
deployment operations ?
e. Does multiple servicing materially increase the complexity?
f. Are recurring software costs significant?
The results presented in this report address these questions and
provide a foundation for estimating software costs based upon historical
records of similar programs as modified by a series of empirical factors.
These empirical factors have been derived through research of current
software cost trends and personal conversations with software development
firms. In this regard, although subjective in nature, the principal factors
affecting software costs are exposed for consideration. The final product
is an estimate of the upper stage recurring and nonrecurring software costs
for all mission phases with and without space servicing operations.
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2. STUDY APPROACH
Several different approaches were attempted in-an effort to achieve
a "top down" method of estimating software costs but all suffered from a lack
of sufficient substantive data to correlate the results with historical informa-
tion. The approach which was finally selected uses an estimate of the re-
quired machine instructions and can be related to some extent with previous
developmental and operational programs although it does require empirical
judgment in addition. To this extent, the results can be used to arrive at a
realistic estimate of software costs for comparison with the total program
effort. The approach selected to estimate software costs consists of the
following two efforts:
a. Estimate upper stage operational software requirements
by functional analysis.
b. Develop software cost factors based upon historical data
and a survey of current computer firm practices.
The necessary information involved with estimating upper stage
software requirements is shown schematically in Figure 2-1. Several
mission classes were selected for analysis, each having increasingly complex
software requirements. The first mission of interest is one of deploying
payloads in geosynchronous orbit with an expendable upper stage, similar
to current Titan IIIC transtage operations. Airborne computer software
requirements for this type of mission are well defined in terms of words
of instructions, computer capacity, etc., and therefore offer a basis for
comparing additional functions leading up to and including space servicing
operations.
Subsequent missions include deployment of a payload in geo-
synchronous orbit with a recoverable upper stage. The initial part of
the operation is similar to the first mission but the added complexities
of guidance reinitialization, retrofire, and rendezvous with the Shuttle
in low-earth orbit are required. The next step that follows incorporates
retrieval of payloads, requiring a rendezvous and docking capability in
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Figure 2-1. Payload/Tug Software
geosynchronous orbit. The final step for geosynchronous operations
involves servicing up to as many as four different satellites at different
longitude positions. Modules are removed and replaced in each satellite
and the upper stage returns to the Shuttle with the failed space replaceable
units (SRUs). The commonality between missions is obvious and, consequently,
the subsequent functional analysis addresses primarily the multiple service
mission as compared to expendable upper stage operations. Visibility is
maintained such that each degree of complexity is readily seen as it
contributes to the total effort.
In this approach, the only unique point relative to payload defini-
tions is that the design approach selected is based upon preliminary designs
of several DOD and NASA satellites developed at The Aerospace Corporation.
The satellites must obviously be of a serviceable design and are assumed to
be three-axis stabilized to permit rendezvous and docking. Further
definition is provided in the following section, Ground Rules and Assumptions.
Selection of an upper stage configuration is not particularly
important to this effort. The functions to be performed are essentially
independent of the stage performance capability, at least as far as software
requirements are concerned. However, it is important to specify the level
of autonomy employed by the upper stage as well as service equipment
interfaces, since these directly relate to all phases of software usage.
Numerous studies have been performed, but the level of autonomy is
currently undefined as are rendezvous and docking sensors and equipment.
Therefore, it was necessary to define an upper stage concept that could be
employed for space servicing. To aid this process a top level contingency
analysis was performed (Ref. 1). In this way it was possible to arrive at
a reasonable level of autonomy as well as a definition of typical instrumenta-
tion and equipment for the upper stage. This then cascades into various
software requirements for ground checkout and flight operations support,
impacting on both design,development, testing and engineering (DDT&E)
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and recurring software costs. The rationale, guidelines, and assumptions
selected are provided in the next section.
The remainder of the elements shown in Figure 1-1 relate to
developing timelines, sequences of events, and functional analyses of the
various missions. By this approach, based on prior program experience,
it is possible to delineate the number of words of instructions. Although
this process is reasonably straightforward for spaceborne computer
operations (because of definable boundary conditions), it becomes very
difficult for ground and flight support systems. In this regard, various
contractor study results were employed where appropriate, and integrated
with the experience obtained from USAF launch vehicle and satellite test
operations. This then represents the approach employed to arrive at soft-
ware requirements for upper stage operations with and without a space
servicing capability.
The second phase of the study approach performed in parallel
with the functional analyses consisted of performing research on existing
software cost data. There already exists a repository of data at The
Aerospace Corporation relative to SAMSO programs of the past. However,
with the exception of the Titan IIIC program, it is difficult to relate the
resultant cost to an initial set of requirements. The same was true of
data obtained from computer and software firms. Historically, software
requirements continually change during the program development with
little traceability to original cost estimates.
Each contractor tends to cost software in a somewhat different
manner. In each instance, when reviewing this subject, the contractor was
asked what he would base his cost estimate on if a proposal were requested
for a program such as the Shuttle upper stage. Many factors are involved,
but no consistent trend was obvious. Perhaps the first point of note was the
question by the contractors of, "What budget has been allocated?" It then
appeared that to the greatest extent possible the contractors would attempt
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to scope the interpretation of software requirements to fit the budget.
This is not altogether without reason since most contracts in the past have
had a very loose definition of software requirements. The contractor is
then left with the positive injunction to develop an operational system within
whatever budget allocation is provided. In essence, no one has any general
set of guidelines. Each program is assessed separately depending upon
market conditions.
Several empirical factors do however appear to influence the
contractor response. These factors are generally recognized by the
majority of the industry, but little quantifiable data exists to produce a
firm set of relationships. The approach taken here then is to employ
rational factors for the several variables involved, to arrive at a reason-
able upper bounds of software costs. The factors involved are discussed
in Section 5. The values employed in the final cost estimate are defined
in Section 6. Since judgment is involved, the values selected must be
considered in light of the study objectives to estimate the software cost
and the impact of servicing operations on the Shuttle upper stage
program. Further effort is desirable to research other programs in an
attempt to quantify these parameters and develop firm software cost
estimating relationships.
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3. GROUND RULES AND ASSUMPTIONS
Before the functional analysis of upper stage operations can be
considered, the specific ground rules and assumptions used in this analysis
must be clearly defined. Basically, there are three major points which are
somewhat arbitrary but which form the foundation of the analysis which follows.
a. Servicing operations are a support function performed in
response to a payload user request.
b. Upper stage operations require only a minimal interface
with the Shuttle.
c. The service unit is essentially a self-contained entity
programmed to perform the service function after docking
with the payload has been accomplished.
In considering the overall operational concept, it is important to
distinguish between the roles of the service agency versus those of the
payload user agency. The user is the only one qualified to diagnose an off-
nominal condition for a given satellite to determine if servicing is required.
It is the user who must specify the unit to be replaced. It is also the user
who must perform the system checkout after the satellite has been serviced.
The same procedures would be employed as those at the time of initial
deployment to bring the satellite to an operational state. Consequently,
this capability must reside with the user and,therefore, no checkout capa-
bility exists with the service unit. Although the software problem of
isolating a failed component may be significant, it should not be affected
by the satellite's being reconfigured for space servicing. Essentially, the
same information is required for subsystem monitoring and diagnosis,
whether of an expendable or serviceable configuration. The failure must
be isolated before corrective action can be initiated. With space servicing,
it is only necessary to isolate the failure to the SRU, since bench testing
can be performed in the laboratory after return of the module. Therefore,
there may actually be a reduction in monitoring requirements. The impor-
tant point is that any such software requirements have been disassociated
from the logistics operation and consequently have no impact on upper stage
software requirements.
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It is also assumed that the payload user has the responsibility for
placing the payload in a serviceable configuration. All satellites to be
serviced are assumed to be attitude-stabilized in all three axes. However,
a given satellite may be earth-oriented, sun-oriented, or inertially fixed
in space, depending upon its mission. Rendezvous and docking instrumen-
tation must be incorporated into the satellite design and,consequently, the
orientation must be known to support the acquisition mode of the upper stage.
For the purpose here, the satellite is assumed to be pre-positioned for
rendezvous and docking as shown in Figure 3-1. In addition, all appendages
are assumed to be retracted out of the path of approach of the upper stage.
Once the payload has been placed in the proper position, the user communi-
cates this information to the servicing operations center authorizing the
rendezvous to proceed. In this way, there is no crosslink or interface
between spaceborne communications systems. This is particularly important
when considering the wide variety of payloads and user agencies which may
be involved.
Interfaces between the upper stage and the Shuttle are considered
only insofar as the software problem is concerned. There must be an RF
command link from the Shuttle to the upper stage to support stage retrieval.
Space servicing operations are assumed to have no impact on this link. The
Shuttle is assumed to have the capability to initialize the upper stage guidance
system at the time of deployment. It is assumed that the same RF link is
employed. As an alternative, the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS)
system may be used for the same functions. In either case, the airborne
computer must be capable of being updated relative to its own state vector.
Also, signal conditioning and encoding/decoding of all telemetry information
must be employed. These functions are all common to any Shuttle upper
stage independent of servicing operations.
It is further assumed that there is no interface between the upper
stage and the payloads when a service unit is employed. It is feasible to
deploy payloads on a service mission, but the only physical interface with
the payload is derived from the service unit, not the upper stage. On the
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Figure 3-1. Space-Servicing Operations
other hand, the service unit is assumed to have both a physical and signal
interface with the upper stage. This is shown in Figure 3-2. Rendezvous
and docking sensors must be located near the forward face of the service
unit to provide an unobstructed view of the payload.
The service unit is initialized by the upper stage computer when
rendezvous has been achieved and a hard dock established. Rendezvous is
performed by aid of a laser radar with corner reflectors on the payload.
The airborne functions are normally automated with a command override
capability from mission control. In the event system errors preclude
acquisition, it will be necessary to update the guidance system from the
ground. A standoff maneuver is performed when the upper stage is approxi-
mately 30 to 50 meters from the payload. Visual monitoring is then per-
formed via the television receiver to assure that the payload is in a proper
configuration for docking. If so, the docking and servicing sequence is
enabled by ground command and the functions are performed automatically.
An override and backout capability exists at all times by virtue of manned
interactive support through the command receiver.
Under normal circumstances, the upper stage maneuvers to the
payload via signals from sensors mounted on the service unit.. A hard dock is
performed and verified by on-board sensors. The verification signal
energizes the service unit sequence to initiate servicing. The necessary
sequence of events and time periods involved are shown in Figure 3-3. It
is assumed that the service unit docking attachments snub the payload to
a properly indexed position. Otherwise, indexing could be performed by
the service unit to seek a known detent position. The position of the pay-
load relative to the service unit must be known and controlled to effect
a proper changeout of modules. This series of events, to remove and
replace SRUs, is assumed to be preprogrammed in the service unit
sequencer prior to launch. There is no uncertainty involved unless a
verification signal fails to allow the full sequence of events to be executed.
The manned interactive command override would then be necessary.
* For the purpose of this task the MSFC Full Capability Tug has been
assumed as the upper stage. The results are applicable to other
configurations as well.
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After servicing one payload, the upper stage performs another
standoff maneuver while payload checkout is performed by the payload user.
To minimize the possibility of electrical shorts during servicing, the pay-
load is powered down. After standoff has been achieved, the payload is
again powered up and all retracted appendages returned to their operational
position. If checkout is unsatisfactory, the payload user must decide the
next course of action and relay this to the Shuttle operations control center.
He may elect to recycle all events, call up other SRUs on the next servicing
mission, or, if performance allows, return thepayload for laboratory
inspection. The payload user is the only agency capable of making these
decisions, recalling that Shuttle operations are assumed to be a supporting
role. In this way also, the upper stage airborne system is not complicated
by checkout routines for various payloads.
Performance analyses have shown that the upper stage may be
capable of servicing four or more payloads on a single flight, if the flight is
limited to seven days. This will vary with the final selection of the stage
configuration which is to be made sometime in the near future. For the
purpose of this study, to assess software requirements, it is assumed that
a capability exists to service up to four satellites in geosynchronous orbit.
Therefore, it is necessary to provide an update capability for the upper
stage guidance system.
This can easily be achieved in one of two ways. The ephemeris
of each payload is always well known as a result of long periods of tracking.
This ephemeris can be automatically assumed by the upper stage prior to
initiating transfer to a second satellite position. All errors accumulated
by the airborne system up through the servicing period would therefore be
nulled. This would have a minimal impact on the airborne software. The
same routines and functions would be employed for each maneuver, the only
potential changes being limited to coefficients to reflect mass and inertia
changes. Since these are seldom critical, they can be preprogrammed.
The alternative is to provide updates via tracking data through the
upper stage command receiver. For high-altitude operations, the existing
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tracking networks provide sufficient coverage for this function. The TDRS
would be employed for low-altitude operations. In either case, the space-
borne system must have the capability to receive, decode, read, and verify
the input to the airborne computer. This requires a relatively small but
not insignificant number of software instructions and, therefore, will be
incorporated when estimating software requirements.
One final point remains to be established regarding manned-
interactive support at the Shuttle Operations Center. A review of the upper
stage functions indicates that for the most part, under normal conditions,
all airborne functions can be automated. This builds upon current practice
for Transtage, Centaur, and Agena operations, as examples. The upper
stage guidance system is assumed to be sufficiently accurate to place the
upper stage within laser acquisition range of the payload to be serviced.
Except for the standoff inspection mraneuver, all rendezvous and docking
functions can be automated with relative ease and should not present any
severe technical problems. However, the capability to automate onboard
systems to respond to contingency situations could severely impact the
overall software requirements. If, on the other hand, a high degree of
monitoring and control is exercised from the ground, the operations control
center would experience a severe software impact. This position was
resolved by performing a top level contingency analysis, which is documented
as Reference 1. A brief summary is provided below to indicate the influence
on scoping the software problem.
The contingency analysis is based upon an analogy by fault tree
application to the basic question, "What can cause space servicing of a
payload to fail?" A search is then made to categorize all the paths leading
to this failure condition. The failure paths can subsequently be traced to
hardware elements, from which evolve safety design requirements. In
this particular application, it is not necessary to define equipment design
approaches, but to determine whether sufficient cause exists to justify
manned-interactive operations. Secondly, if man is involved, to what
degree is unique software support required?
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Failure of the service mission can result from four unique events
in the total sequence of op.erations:
a. The upper stage fails to complete rendezvous and docking.
b. Rendezvous and docking are completed successfully,
but the service unit fails.
c. Servicing of the payload is completed, but the service
unit/payload combination fails to undock.
d. During the approach, standoff, undock, or other pro-
grammed maneuvers, a catastrophic collision occurs
between the upper stage and the payload.
In each instance, the failure condition may be brought about by
failures in the upper stage, the service unit, or the payload. A typical
breakdown of failure causes is given in Figure 3-4, showing payload failures
that could result in a catastrophic collision with the upper stage. This is
one of 12 such trees. The emphasis of this one in particular is that failures
could occur which result in unknown obstructions in the path of approach
of the upper stage, e.g., a pressure vessel fracture (mechanical failure)
damaging a retraction mechanism. Indications to the payload user may
erroneously indicate that a successful retraction has occurred. This is
only pertinent if the appendage obstructs the docking path; hence the "and"
gate requiring two conditions to exist simultaneously. These events can
be broken down further for specific payloads (and upper stage designs) to
arrive at reliability and safety criteria relative to redundancy and probability
of occurrence.
It is sufficient for this effort to indicate that conditions could arise
over the broad spectrum of payloads which would jeopardize the upper
stage or the payload if completely automated servicing were conducted.
Manned interaction is necessary to support contingencies, but there is no
need to take an active role in the nominal servicing functions. This approach
forms the basis of the following assumptions to be employed in sizing the
software problem:
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Figure 3-4. Contingency Analysis
a. All nominal functions of rendezvous, dock, SRU replace-
ment, and undock are performed in an automated manner.
b. Inspection, command override, backout initiation, guidance
updates, and other go/no-go decisions are made by manned
interactive support at the control center.
c. The Operations Control Center has a unique monitoring
capability only as required for go/no-go decisions and is
an adjunct to Shuttle operations, so that fundamental
software support and other interface information is readily
available.
This completes the definition of the operations concept, ground
rules and assumptions, except for ground checkout. It has been assumed
that ground operations at the NASA Kennedy Space Center (KSC) will incor-
porate a system similar to the Launch Processing System (LPS) defined
in Reference 2. Therefore, only those functions related to the upper stage/
service unit checkout and launch preparation will be considered. All other
support functions (i. e., fueling, control alignment, etc.) are assumed to be
available.
One final caution should be observed. The operational concept
employed in these ground rules is based upon experience gained from
existing USAF programs. In these programs, preprogrammed automated
operations are repeatedly employed. For instance, orbital insertion of
payloads requires no direct action by the mission control center after lift
off. A different philosophy exists at the NASA Mission Control Center,
wherein manned space operations have necessitated close support at the
MCC. Consequently, altering the ground rules to abide by this concept
could possibly affect the conclusions presented later in this report. If the
shuttle upper stage is to require close support from the MCC then it is
recommended that the software cost projections be reevaluated.
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4. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSES
Only one mission has been analyzed in detail. This was mission
No. 3, geosynchronous servicing of four payloads. An upper stage similar
to the full capability Tug was assumed. The remaining missions are
primarily subsets of this one case. Data from the current Titan IIIC
program were used to establish functional breakdowns and commonality
of computer operations. The functional analysis was carried to the
third level to derive software requirements. These requirements are then
integrated to arrive at a total software budget, recognizing that many
functions are common and do not require separate and distinct programs.
Conversations with NASA indicate that the Tug computer has been sized to
approximately 50K words of instruction. This serves as a basis for
comparison as the functional analysis progresses.
The software development process is shown schematically in
Figure 4-1. There are three basic functions involved: spaceborne systems,
flight support operations, and ground checkout operations. Other items,
such as crew training simulators, etc., were not considered but may be
substantial in the final analysis of overall Shuttle System operations. The
development cycle for each area is somewhat repetitive. Preliminary
system design is performed to arrive at a hardware definition. From this
effort evolves a preliminary software budget for the vehicle computer,
instrumentation, and flight support. As the design effort, progresses, three
separate software specifications evolve: the integrated spaceborne require-
ments, the instrumentation list, and the flight support software specifica-
tion. Each area of development is iterative in nature requiring a constant
reevaluation of software requirements versus implementation.
Coding of software normally begins after the software specification
has been firmed up. Generally, from this point on, contractors feel
qualified to estimate software costs. However, experience has shown that
a significant amount of effort is required during the design phase to develop
equations, interface relationships and sequences of operations. The results
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Figure 4-1. Single Mission Typical Software Development
of one survey (Ref. 3) indicate that software development can be subdivided
into three elements:
a. Analysis and design
b. -Coding and auditing
c. Checkout, validation and testing
The results of the survey are reasonably consistent for the three applica-
tions tabulated in Figure 4-2. For the purposes of this analysis, it has
been assumed that 35% of the effort will be devoted to analysis and design
of the software algorithms, 20% to coding, and 45% to test and checkout.
This allocation will in reality vary with each functional element considered
in the reference mission analysis. However, for the purpose of the total
software effort, the above distribution appears reasonable.' It will be shown
later that this breakdown of the software development cycle is necessary if
the empirical factors for estimating software costs are to be employed.
The software requirements were derived from a functional analysis
of mission three, geosynchronous servicing of up to four satellites at
different longitude placements. The top level (Level 1) flow is shown in
Figure 4-3. Each function is developed to the third level for the three
software regions of interest: spaceborne, ground, and flight support software.
A sample of this development is shown in Figure 4-4 for the function
"Deploy Tug. " At this point it is possible to estimate the software require-
ments to perform each function. The emphasis is primarily on those
additional functions required to support space servicing.
The results of the functional analysis are provided as Appendix A
and are summarized in Tables 4-1 and 4-2. Table 4-1 indicates the various
software modules required to perform the identified list of upper stage
functions. Table 4-2 provides a similar summary for ground checkout
operations. The flight support software at the mission control center is
more difficult to define and consequently is derived in a different manner,
as explained later.
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Table 4-1. Functional Flow Links to Computer Program Requirements
PROGRAM MODULE
NAV DIGITAL SEQUEN- HORIZ UTIL
FUNCTIONAL EXECU- (inertial) GUID- AUTOPILOT FOR PROP COMMUN STAR CING O/B HAZ SENS REND DOCK- SERV SUBROUT
FLOW ELEMENT TIVE and ANCE (powered MATTING UTIL PROCES ALIGN (CMD, C/O ANAL PROC GUID ING MGT AND
(update) (and coast) (discretes CONSTRAINTS
1.0 IMU ALIGNMENT - SYSTEM C/O X X X X  X X X
2.0 COMPUTER LOADING X X X X
3.0 APS ACTIVATION X X X X
4.0 RECEIVE AND EXECUTE MISSION ENABLE X X X
5.0 MANEUVER TO AQUIRE HORIZON X X X X X X X
6.0 COMPUTE BURN PARAMETERS X X X X X
7.0 MANEUVER TO REQUIRED ATTITUDE X X XX X
8.0 MAIN ENGINE BURN (2) X X X X X X X
9.0 ACTIVATE DOCKING SUBSYSTEM X X X X
10.0 ORIENT FOR PAYLOAD DOCKING X X X X X
II.0 ACQUIRE AND LOCK-ON TO PAYLOAD X X X X
12.0 DETERMINE RANGE AND RANGE RATE X X X X
13.0 DETERMINE RENDEZVOUS INTERCEPT MVRS X X X X
14.0 APS BURN X X X X X X X
15.0 VERIFY PAYLOAD ORIENT. FOR DOCKING X X X X X X
16.0 DOCK WITH PAYLOAD X X X X
17.0 DESPIN DOCKING MECHANISM X X X X
18.0 CONNECT PAYLOAD UMBILICALS X X X
19.0 CONDUCT PAYLOAD SERVICING X x X X
20.0 UNCOUPLE AND SEPARATE PAYLOAD X X X
21.0 MANEUVER TO SAFE DISTANCE X X X X X X X X
22.0 CHECKOUT P/L AND TUG-GND LINK X X X X X X
23.0 REPEAT 8 TO 22 FOR 3 PAYLOADS X X X
24.0 RECEIVE NAV UPDATE X X X X X
25.0 RECEIVE AND STORE COMMAND SEQUENCE X X X X
26.0 MAIN ENGINE BURN (2) X X X X X X X
27.0 ESTAB COMMUNICATION WITH ORBITER X X X X
28.0 TRANSFER FLT CONTROL OR ORBITER X X X X
29.0 DEACTIVATE AND SAFE MAIN PROP X X X x
30.0 VERIFY ALL SUBSYSTEMS SAFE X X X X
31.0 APS INHIBIT X X X
32.0 STOW APPENDAGES X X X
33.0 PASSIVATE SUBYSTEMS X X X
Table 4-2. Ground Checkout Functions
FUNCTION APPLICATION
PRIMARY SECONDARY
Process Interface Program Prelaunch Launch
FFBD TITLE Control Stimulus Prep. Checks Checks INSTR. INSTR. TOTAL
9. 0 Tug Refurbishment 150, 000
* Safe Systems X 35,000 5, 000
* Process Maint. Data X 100,000 -
* Prep. Service Unit X X 5,000 5,000
11.0 Payload Tug/Mating Ops 335,000
* Tug Interface Verify X X 50,000 15,000
* Service Unit Interface X X 50,000 20,000
* Joint Sim. Flight X 150,000 50,000
12.0 Prelaunch Preparation 195,000
e Orbiter Interface
Checks X X 15,000 10,000
* Comb. Sim. Flight X 130,000 40,000
13.0 Launch Preparation 235,000
o Preflight Tug/SU Cks. X 35,000 10, 000
* Load Tug Computer X 50,000 10,000
* Perform Countdown X X 100, 000 30, 000
TOTAL 720,000 195,000 , 0 915,000
* Primary Instructions are those required for a baseline
reference mission
* Secondary Instructions are required to accommodate
additional missions
The results of Table 4-1 have been integrated to arrive at an
estimate of the total number of instructions required for the spaceborne
computer. These results are shown in Table 4-3 for various levels of
complexity. If the upper stage is employed for satellite deployment opera-
tions alone, it is estimated that 27, 000 words of instruction in machine
language will be required. Increasing the time on orbit inherently increases
the complexity of the navigation functions, raising this value to 35, 000 words
of instruction. Incorporating a rendezvous and docking capability requires
an additional 5500 words for a total of 40, 000 words of instruction. These
values form the basic requirement for the upper stage spaceborne computer
within the ground rules and constraints specified in Section 3.
It should also be recognized that for a large number of computer
applications some savings in core storage can be achieved through "packing"
words together. The above estimates have been based upon a 32-bit word
length, however, in many instances an 8 or 16-bit word is adequate for an
instruction. Therefore, a packing formula has been developed, based upon
prior experience, to take advantage of this technique. By improved packing,
the core storage can be reduced by approximately 40%. A further assumption
is made relative to use of a higher order language (HOL). It is anticipated
that the current trend toward higher order languages will continue, with the
end result requiring a slight increase in storage requirements. Although
the higher language improves the programmability, it inherently requires a
modest increase in machine instructions (10%). The total memory size,
based on a 32-bit word, is then estimated to be approximately 27, 000 words
of instruction.
In addition, space servicing will require a modest increase over
and above this value to accommodate discrete commands, the standoff
maneuver, backout and recycle capability, and integration of the sequencer
unit outputs. It is estimated that these functions would require no more
than 1000 additional words of instruction. By comparison, the service
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Table 4-3. Estimation of Servicing Software Cost
(Spaceborne System)
PROGRAM MODULE 2 DAY 6 DAY 6 DAY
DEPLOY ONLY AUTON. NAV. AUTON., REDEZ.
DOCK
INFLIGHT EXECUTIVE 2500 3000 3000
NAV IGATI ON (INERTIAL) 1500 2500 2500
GUIDANCE 2000 2000 2000
DIGITAL AUTOPILOT (POWERED) 2000 2000 2000
DIGITAL AUTOPILOT (COAST) 1500 1500 1500
TELEMETRY FORMATTING 1500 1500 1500
PROPELLANT UTILIZATION 1000 1000 1000
COMMUNICATIONS 1500 1500 1500
STELLAR ALIGNMENT 3000 3000 3000
SEQUENCING 1500 2500 3000
ON BOARD CHECKOUT 4000 5000 6000
HAZARD ANALYSIS 2500 3000 3500
NAVIGATION UPDATE 1000 2000 2000
HORIZON SENSOR (INCLUDES FILTER) N/A 2500 2500
RENDEZVOUS GUI DANCE/TARGETTI NG N/A NIA 3000
DOCKING PROGRAM N/A N/A 2000
UTILITY SUBROUTINES AND CONSTANTS 1500 2000 2500
TOTAL (T) 27,000 35,000 40,500
SHORT INSTRUCTION PACKING
T/5 + (4/5) T/2 = 0. 6T 16,200 21,000 24,300
HOL INCREASE (10%) 1,620 2,100 2,430
MEMORY SI ZE (32 B IT WOR DS) 17, 800 23, 100 26, 730
o INCREASE DUE TO SERVICING FUNCTIONS
/ TUG AIRBORNE COMPUTER 
-- - - -- -- 1000 INSTRUCTIONS
/ SERVICE UNIT SEQUENCER - - - - - -- - - -- 2000 INSTRUCTIONS
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unit- sequencer should require no more than 2000 words of instruction.
These very modest increases are based upon the ground rule that the
servicing functions are primarily discrete on-off signals for removing and
replacing SRUs. All checkout functions are left to the payload user.
Ground support system requirements are considerably more
difficult to estimate. The ground operations functions consist of: (1)
payload, upper stage, and service unit preparation and interface verifica-
tion, (2) prelaunch checkout of the service unit, and (3) post-landing
safing and SRU removal operations. Installation and verification of the
upper stage computer program and the service unit sequencer functions
are also required. The total number of software instructions is placed
between 800, 000 and 1,200, 000 words. The foundation for estimating the
ground system software is based upon the NASA concept of a Launch
Processing System (LPS) as defined in Reference 2. The LPS concept
alters the historical approach of ground systems from special purpose
hardwired consoles to a centralized computer control center for manage-
ment of all launch site functions. In consequence, the impact of upper
stage checkout and service unit installation should be minimal relative
to the overall software requirement, representing less than 10% of the
total estimated software effort associated with the LPS concept. This
value is in reasonable agreement with the Centaur experience (Appendix
B) which has one of the few nearly automated checkout systems.
Mission control center operations are even less well defined than
ground support operations. The functions to be performed can be identified,
such as navigation updates, sequencer override, and if necessary,
subsystem status in addition to visual monitoring. The entire data stream
must be decommutated, formatted and stored for display callup. These
functions are, for the most part, also required for Shuttle support and Tug
operations independent of servicing. The servicing functions will draw upon
a repository of available programs for support with a minimal amount of new
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software required. For this reason, it was not possible to scope the
mission control center software requirements with any degree of certainty
and an alternate approach was employed for the purpose of this study.
It was determined, through conversations with IBM personnel
under contract to NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory, that mission control
software in support of deep space probes and test programs required
between 20, 000 and 30, 000 new words of instruction over and above the
existing software system. This is also in reasonable agreement with the
USAF Satellite Control Facility experience for introducing new programs
into the software system. This value therefore appears to be reasonable
for upper stage support over and above the functions normally required
for Shuttle operations.
In summary, the total software requirements in terms of words
of instructions, to achieve an operational capability to perform space
servicing are:
Item Tug Service Unit
Spaceborne Software 30, 000 2, 000
Ground Checkout/Support 1 x 106 100,000
Mission Control/Flight 30, 000 5, 000
Support
Recurring software costs are anticipated to be relatively low
by comparison with such programs as Apollo, Centaur or Titan IIIC.
For these programs, each mission was essentially unique, and as such,
required modification of the basic software programs. The Shuttle system,
by virtue of its flexibility to accommodate numerous mission operations,
should not require any extensive recurring software effort. The capability
to support a wide variety of operations is inherent in the basic system
development. Some effort will be involved in routine validation of software
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program constants prior to each flight and undoubtedly minor algorithm
changes will occur from time to time. The basis for estimating recurring
costs of software will, therefore, be based upon prior history from the
Titan IIIC and Centaur Programs (Appendix B). This point is discussed
further in the next section.
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5. SOFTWARE COSTING SURVEY
A survey of several software development firms was performed
in an effort to establish a cost basis for the requirements presented in
the previous section. There exists within The Aerospace Corporation
a certain level of experience in cost estimation of software programs.
However, although program costs can be identified, it is extremely
difficult to relate these costs to an initial set of requirements. Therefore,
there exists a great deal of uncertainty in cost estimation relationships
for software. For this reason, it is suggested at the outset that software
costs should be considered within a band of reasonability subject to
numerous factors which influence the final estimate. In the end, it is
primarily a matter of judgment in estimating software costs.
The approach selected is to first provide the background data
existing within The Aerospace Corporation, including published and un-
published results. The uncertainties in this data will be pointed out and
where possible related to other reference information. This can then be
related to data obtained from the MIT Draper Laboratory for the Apollo
program. These results are then considered in light of the primary
factors associated with software cost uncertainties. With this back-
ground, it is then possible to estimate the upper stage DDT&E and
recurring software costs for space servicing operations.
After attempting several different approaches, it was found that
words of instruction in machine language provide a reasonable basis for
estimating software costs. The first set of data is derived from an
Aerospace study in 1973 (Ref. 4) with the results of this effort summarized
in Figure 5-1. Man-months of effort are plotted against the number of
instructions as a point of reference. The man-months provided relate
to the total effort involved including design, coding, and testing of the
software product. However, in some cases the reference points shown
represent only part of the known program effort for which documentation
can be found. For instance, the Saturn V airborne system requires
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Figure 5-1. Software Costs
considerably more than 7000 words, however, the only point of reference
for which cost has been provided is this particular increment. This data
was originally derived from a System Development Corporation survey
(Ref. 5).
It should also be noted that early Titan IIIC data indicated 400
man-months of effort for 8000 words of instruction. This data point
provides a reference point for the Cost Estimating Relationship (CER)
but fails to incorporate the total program costs. The total costs are
better represented by the band of 800 to 1200 man-months for 12, 000 to
13, 000 words of instruction. This estimate reflects the fact that up to
four different contractors were involved in this effort aid,. therefore,
the total cost is more representative of the cost of the software development.
In any program of this type, a significant cost will always be associated
with integration of all the contractor efforts. The same will be true with
the upper stage, and although NASA may perform the integration role, there
still will be an associated cost. In the case of the Titan IIIC example, the
original software development performed by The Martin Marietta Corpora-
tion was estimated to be approximately two million dollars. The inclusion of
associated contractor efforts (Delco, Logicon, Aerospace) raises this
cost to approximately five million dollars (1200 man-months).
Another important point to make is that often NASA or other
agencies will inherently pay for software development which is never used.
Programs will be coded, checked out, and subsequently discarded because
the initial requirements are no longer valid. A point of reference is
provided by the Apollo program. The software development cycle is shown
in Figure 5-2 as provided by the MIT Draper Laboratory. Their records
(Ref. 6) indicate that approximately 160, 000 words of instruction were
developed for the Apollo program through the first lunar landing. This
was estimated to be approximately $45 million dollars for software alone,
or $280 per word of instruction. However, MIT developed, coded, tested
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Figure 5-2. Apollo Software Development
and delivered over 500, 000 words of instruction ( Ref. 7) to NASA for
Apollo. Because of changing specifications, new ideas for various
algorithms and computer modifications, there was a large portion of
developed software that was never used in an operational sense.
This then becomes a better reference for estimating the cost per
word of instruction. The ratio then becomes approximately $90 per word
of instruction. This point lies remarkably close to the CER curve of Figure
5-1. It appears reasonable to expect the cost per word of instruction to
decrease as the program size increases. The Apollo program was some-
what unique in that the original specifications called for a 4000-word
memory capacity. This was subsequently modified, but computer capacity
was a continual problem during the entire development cycle. For large
programs of this type, it should be expected that the average cost of
software would be relatively low. In the lower range of programs, the
ratio: is between $200 and $300 per word of instruction, depending upon
the degree of integration involved.
The cost relationship of Figure 5-1 cannot be used alone without
further consideration. Because of the uncertainties associated with nearly
all software development programs, it is necessary to define additional
factors influencing software cost and provide some judgment in arriving at
an estimate for the Shuttle upper stage. As a result of discussions with
numerous contractors, the following factors were determined to be
representative of the uncertainties associated with estimating software
development costs based solely upon number of instructions:
a. Computer capacity
b. Complexity of program
c. Prior experience or history
d. Language employed
e. Degree of integration effort required
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The number of words of instruction is treated as the basic cost of
developing software. If there are no hidden problems, it should be possible
to estimate a word count for any series of functions to be performed.
This has been done in the previous sections for upper stage operations
involving space servicing. The basic cost of developing the spaceborne
software is estimated to be 30, 000 words of instruction, requiring 892
man-months of effort. If a man-month is taken at a cost of $4000, the cost
of developing the basic software will be $3. 56 million dollars. Manpower
costs will inherently rise with time; hence, it may be desirable to increase
this value to reflect costs in the 1980 time period. However, because the
magnitude of other uncertainties appears to be considerably more signifi-
cant, the inflationary effect of man-month charges is neglected for the time
being.
The additional effort to accommodate space servicing functions is
estimated to be 92 man-months with an associated cost of $0. 37 million
dollars. This then provides an unadjusted basic software development
cost of $3. 95 million dollars. Taken as a ratio for a point of reference,
this provides $123/word of instruction. However, the remaining factors
will have a substantial impact on these values.
Computer capacity has been recognized for many years as a
major factor in software cost overruns. In past programs, the major
concern, in terms of cost and weight, has been the spaceborne computer.
Therefore, rigid controls were placed on the computer design long
before the software had been sized correctly. This invariably led to soft-
ware programs which exceeded the computer capacity requiring various
overlay procedures, reprogramming and redesign of the software to
remain within the hardware constraints.
In the future, this trend should be reversed. Hardware costs
(relative to the same performance) have been and should decrease for
some time to come. Reference 3 points out that in the 1980 to 1985
time period the software costs of an operational system will be three to
four times the hardware costs. This is illustrated in Figure 5-3. The
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Figure 5-3. Computer Capacity Impact on Software Costs
principal message is that computer capacity in terms of weight and cost
should no longer be allowed to constrain the software because the system
cost will favor large excesses in capacity to minimize the chance of placing
constraints on the software.
In the same figure, another curve is presented from Reference 3.
There are no historical data points to verify the shape of this curve, but the
fundamental characteristic is accepted by all the software firms surveyed.
As the software needs approach the capacity limits of the computer, more
and more work is required to code a set of requirements. It is not unreason-
able to expect this cost to double or go even higher. Invariably the contrac-
tor response was to prefer computer sizing of approximately twice the
software instruction count.
The Shuttle upper stage computer has not been selected as of this
time, but estimates obtained from NASA Marshall Space Flight Center
indicate a projected capacity of 50, 000 words. The estimated software
requirements from this study then represent, a capacity utilization of 60%.
Without further definition of the upper stage and the subsystem redundancy
requirements, the only position to be taken at this time is that computer
capacity will be sufficient to disregard a further increase in the coding
effort. However, if future estimates result in a substantial increase in the
capacity utilization, it is recommended that the curve of Figure 5-3 be
used to account for the increased effort required. In this event, the
factor would be applied to all three phases of software development. More
effort would be required for design, coding, and certainly for test and
validation.
The next parameter to be considered is the "complexity" factor.
This is a highly subjective term but one recognized as important in
estimating costs. When surveying various software firms, each indicated
that his response to an RFP would depend a great deal on the "complexity"
of the software and "prior experience" with the type of effort requested.
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Since these are judgment factors, they have been ranked ranging from
complex manned operations such as Apollo, to less complex automated
satellite operations.
Manned systems tend to require very flexible programs to
accommodate all identifiable contingencies, with numerous redundant
paths and self-check capabilities. Automated satellite operations, similar
to the USAF Satellite Control Facility, tend to be nontime critical with
limitations imposed simply by the onboard computer capacity. Other
programs, such as the Titan III-Centaur, are completely preprogrammed and
many functions are time critical.
Upper stage operations, including servicing are judged to lie
between the Apollo level of complexity and the Titan IIIC program. Many
functions can and should be preprogrammed, similar to the Titan system,
but the capability must exist for manned interactive support thereby
increasing the level of complexity somewhat. For the purpose of this effort,
it is estimated that upper stage software requirements will be 50% more
complex than the Titan IIIC system. Since the Centaur data point lies
near the curve of Figure 5-1, this appears to be a reasonable point of
reference to correlate the complexity parameter.
In addition, most contractors in the software field are considered
to be competent to develop software for the Shuttle upper stage. Most of
these have some degree of "prior" experience from which they can respond
with confidence. For example, the carryover of the Atlas Centaur
software experience to the Titan III Centaur is estimated to be as high as
80% utilization of prior efforts. However, since space servicing
represents an increase in the operational dimensions of the upper stage,
it appears prudent to provide some extra margin for lack of prior experience
in this particular area. A 20% factor over and above the basic word count
has been selected. it also appears reasonable that this prior experience
factor would be reflected in all three phases of software development:
design, coding and testing.
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The next parameter of interest is the selection of a higher order
language for coding the software requirements. Higher order languages
are inherent in future programs and the question is not whether there will
be one but rather what type will be selected. These languages will in
general always result in a larger core storage, as implied in Table 4-3.
However, this effect is more than compensated by the reduction in software
design effort to implement and to validate the coding effort. Fortran
itself represents a form of higher order language as compared to machine
language programming employed in early applications. Estimates vary
considerably but, for example, one word in Fortran can be equated to two
or more words of machine code. Jovial is estimated on the average to
result in a four-to-one ratio. Figure 5-4 provides an estimate of the
coding factor for various languages and then relates this to an overall
relative cost factor. The general feeling among contractors was that to
expect a reduction in manpower beyond 50% would be unrealistic, no matter
what language is assumed. The exact shape of the relationship is unknown
but experience indicates it should be somewhat similar to that of Figure
5-4. For the purpose of this analysis, it was assumed that a higher order
language would be employed [similar to Houston Assembly Language (HAL)]
and that a 30% reduction in the software coding and validation could be
realized.
Finally, it is necessary to consider the problem of software
integration. If the software requirements are firm and if only one contractor
is involved with the software development, then this effect should be minimal.
H-lowever, again the historical experience has proven otherwise for programs
of the magnitude of Titan IIIC or the Shuttle upper stage. In attempting to
place some value on the impact of integration, consideration was given to
the two efforts which bound the upper stage development, the Titan IIIC
and the Apollo programs. In the Apollo program, MIT performed the
integration role for the airborne system working with other contractors
and NASA to develop specifications, consider hardware problems, and
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Figure 5-4. Software Language
resolve conflicts. As time passed, NASA assumed more and more of this
responsibility but the effect is the same. On any program of this complexity
and magnitude, some allowance in software development costs must be
made to account for integration of subelements into a composite program.
It is estimated that this effort was in the neighborhood of 50% of the basic
software development cost.
The Titan IIIC program also required a sizable integration effort,
but since the basic effort was smaller than Apollo, the ratio of total cost
to that of the prime contractor is higher. The addition of Delco, Logicon,
and Aerospace efforts to those of the Martin Marietta Corporation (a
prime contractor) resulted in software costs rising from approximately
$2. 5 million dollars to $5 million dollars. This is not to imply that the
costs were not justified. The effort required to integrate all. elements of
the software (including validation, testing, installation, etc.) is sizable
and although it does not of itself produce code, it is a cost which must be
recognized and accounted for. Hence, for the Titan IIIC program, the
ratio of the total cost to that of the basic program cost is a factor of two.
The Shuttle upper stage will also require a great deal of integration
effort whether performed by NASA or a contractor. In either event, the
costs will be reflected against the software development. This integration
charge will be reflected in all phases of development, although it could be
heaviest in the test and validation areas. Therefore, for the purpose of
estimating software costs, it will be assumed that the upper stage will
have approximately the same level of integration effort as the Titan IIIC
program. An allowance of 100% above the basic software development
will therefore be employed.
The overall effect of these parameters is significant. To summa-
rize, the basic spaceborne software development cost was estimated to be
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$3. 93 million dollars. Adjustments for other influencing parameters are
summarized as:
Computer capacity No impact
Complexity factor 50% allowance
Prior experience 20% allowance
Language 30% reduction
Integration 100% allowance
The adjusted spaceborne software cost is then estimated, on the basis of
$4000 per man-month, to be as given below:
Total estimated cost Basic Adjusted
($4000/MM)
Without servicing
(892 MM) $3.56M - $8.98M-
Servicing increment
(92 MM) $0.37M $0.93M
Total $ 3. 93M $9. 91M
A similar approach may be taken for estimating ground checkout
and support program costs. Although the same variables influence the
overall cost, there is less definition of the impact due to the lack of histori-
cal data. There are very few systems which have employed any substantial
amount of computerized control. The only data developed from the survey
is presented in Figure 5-5. This figure provides data points for both ground
checkout and mission control center programs. The Centaur data is devel-
oped from Appendix B. The Agena data is derived from conversations with
Lockheed Missile and Space Company (LMSC) and Aerospace Corporation
personnel. The referenced JPL data is derived by conversations with IBM
personnel (the principal developer of the programs).
The Centaur program is the only one that approaches automated
checkout and even this falls short of what is planned for the Shuttle upper
stage. The Agena data is actually a composite or integrated effect of
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Figure 5-5. Ground Support Software
several years of development, modification, and redevelopment, with
an integrated output of approximately one million words of code. This is
in the range of what will be required for the upper stage, as explained in
the previous section. The average cost is approximately seven dollars
per word of instruction, considerably less than for spaceborne systems.
The total cost for the ground checkout and support system is
estimated to be $7. 2 million dollars, based upon 1800 man-months at
$4000 per man-month. For the purpose of this analysis and because the
degree of integration and other factors are not readily definable, this
value has been increased to $10 per word, giving approximately a 30%
margin. The upper stage ground software cost is then placed at approx-
imately $10 million dollars. Space servicing systems will require some
support but it should be relatively minimal. It is estimated to be in the
range of 10% of the basic requirement or one million dollars. The total
for ground support software is then $11 million dollars.
Flight support software costs are even more vague in that much
of the software must already exist for Shuttle operations. Again, a cost
of $10 per word of instruction (to be conservative) appears reasonable
in the region of interest of Figure 5-5. The flight support software is
then estimated to cost $300, 000. An additional increment is provided
to accommodate a command and control uplink/downlink of 5000 words.
Total flight support software development costs then become $350, 000.
Recurring software costs represent a new dimension altogether.
Recurring costs are real but seldom are recorded. The principal reason
is that there is no way to define the requirements for new or modified
programs. It is generally assumed that the original program development
was complete and therefore recurring support is not required. What little
experience that exists indicates otherwise. The Titan IIIC program
appears to be a reasonable example. Each time a new mission is
developed (nearly each flight), it becomes necessary to develop new
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guidance coefficients, new discrete profiles, and different timelines.
These changes must be verified, installed, and checked. On the average,
this is estimated to cost approximately $100, 000 for each new mission
definition. The data of Appendix B indicates Centaur follow-on flight
software costs to be lower than this, approximately $26, 000 to $53, 000.
If a conservative value of $100, 000 is employed for an estimated
10 upper stage flights per year, the recurring mission software cost would
be one million dollars annually. This should serve as an upper bound,
since existing studies show an average of six to eight flights per year, and
the costs should be mere in line with Centaur operations. Assuming a
cost associated with space-servicing to be 10% of the nominal recurring
cost, it is possible to arrive at the total software cost estimate provided
in Table 5-1. Note values have been supplied for recurring flight support
software costs representing a lower bound or threshold cost of support.
Some cost will be accrued but the value should be low enough to be negligible
for this analysis.
In the search for supporting data relative to Mission Control Cen-
ter operations, it was possible to obtain actual records from IBM at Hou-
ston. This record provides, by the month, the actual man power charges
for Apollo and Skylab programs from inseption to phase out. The records
also provide computer operating hours. This data is very helpful in evalu-
ating the general character of support required for large complex programs
but there is no way to relate these costs to a reference set of initial require-
ments. For this reason, it is difficult to extrapolate this data to future
requirements. However, because it does represent one of the few sources
of firm data for large programs, it has been incorporated into this report
as Appendix C to serve as a reference for any future work on software
costs.
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Table 5-1. Software Costs Summary
DDT&E $M *RECURRING $M/YR
TYPE TUG SERV TUG SERV
SPACEBORNE 8.98 0.93 1.00 0.10
GROUND SUPPORT 10.00 1.00 1.00 0.10
FLIGHT SUPPORT 0.30 0.05 0.101 0. 05"
TOTAL 19. 28 1. 98 2. 10 0. 25
$21. 26 $2. 35/YR
*ESTIMATED FROM T- I I I AND SCF EXPERIENCE
::ESTIMATED THRESHOLD VALUES
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In summary, it is to be expected that the software development
costs for the Shuttle upper stage will be approximately $20 million
dollars. Space servicing should account for a little over 10% of this
value. Recurring software is estimated to be a little over two million
dollars per year in support of a very active upper stage program.
However, a few final remarks are necessary to place these
results in proper perspective. The software development costs for
the upper stage are not insignificant; however, they do not appear to
be unreasonably high either. Software costs should amount to no more
than 5 or 10% of the total program DDT&E. This will, of course,
depend to some extent on the final configuration selected. The degree
of redundancy, flight support, and manned interactive participation
will have a significant influence on these costs. However, probably
the most important factors to be considered are the firmness of the
software specification and the degree of integration required. The
very size of the NASA organization and the inherent involvement of
numerous Centers can easily lead to major problems in integrating all
elements of the software. In addition, support for a large number of
satellite programs will also pose severe problems in deriving a firm
specification.
It should also be kept in mind that there are a large number of
shortcomings with this analysis. When surveying contractors for data,
a great deal of sympathy was received but little substantive data. In
general, the contractors agreed that the factors employed in this analysis
represent the real essence of the problem. The problem is in quantifying
these parameters to provide some uniformity of results. Understandably,
each contractor has developed methods of his own to estimate software
costs, but these tend to be proprietary and probably have as many factors
influencing their results as has this report. The cooperation of the
contractors was very gratifying, as was support from within the NASA
organization. Everyone agreed that there is a real need for improved
cost estimating techniques.
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It is also generally agreed that methods must be found to reduce
future software development costs. New techniques need to be explored,
higher order languages developed, and possibly structured programming
employed. Programs are becoming so complex and so costly that unless
these or other techniques are employed, the probability of achieving an
operational program within any type of budget projections will be extremely
remote.
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APPENDIX A
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D-1 CENTAUR SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT COSTS
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
LEWIS RESEARCH CENTER
CLEVELAND. OHIO 44135
APR 25 IrA4
REPLY TO
ATTN OF: 9200(NW)
Mr. Robert R. Wolfe
NASA Study Director
The Aerospace Corporation
Post Office Box 92957
Los Angeles, CA 90009
Subject: D-1 Centaur Software Development Costs
In response to your letter of March 15, 1974, the following information
is forwarded for work being performed under Contract NASW-2575.
A. Introduction
The cost data contained herein are formulated with respect to:
I. Airborne software development and checkout costs for the D-l
Centaur program. These costs reflect actual man-hour and computer hour
expenditures for the combined Atlas/Centaur (D-IA) and Titan/Centaur
(D-IT) programs.
2. Non-recurring and recurring software costs associated with mis-
sion variations. These costs reflect expected expenditures, based upon
past experience, for planetary and orbital missions.
The software development costs for the D-l Centaur program reflect
the work required to create the software and program it for the on-board
digital computer whose function is to control various aspects of vehicle
guidance, navigation,.PCM TLM formatting, sequencing, and control require-
ments. A modular software concept was formulated to facilitate software
variations needed to support a variety of mission and vehicle configura-
tions. Costs reflect combined D-IA and D-IT program expenditures since
this work was performed in the same time frame by the same personnel and
is in most cases applicable to both configurations.
The software costs for mission variations are based upon past exper-
ience and knowledge of required task scopes on the D-Centaur program.
The data have been updated to reflect recent D-1 program experience and
are expressed for first and follow-on flight for planetary and orbital
type missions.
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2B. Ground Rules/Assumptions
1. Software costs contained herein are those associated with the
development and checkout of on-board airborne computer programs for the
16K Digital Computer Unit (DCU) used for Atlas/Centaur and Titan/Centaur
missions. Trajectory and performance, stability and control, and loads
analyses are not interpreted as "software" and are not included. (These
are estimated to be 55,000 hours and 1,000 computer hours.)
2. D-IA (Atlas/Centaur) and D-IT (Titan/Centaur) software develop-
ment occurred during the same basic time period and, therefore, corres-
ponding software costs were not individually segregated for each of these
programs. A judgement/experience factor would indicate that either the
D-IA or D-lT program would cost about 85 percent of the total cost, if
done on a separate basis.
3. Software checkout costs are included herein. These costs are
for development of Airborne Computer Software, Computer Controlled Launch
Set (CCLS), and Flight Acceleration Profile (FAP) checkout software.
4. The SDS 930 computer is used to perform software checkout (CCLS
and FAP). This computer is provided to Convair Aerospace Division as
GFP.
C. Software Cost Data
1. D-1 Centaur Program Software Development Cost
Computer Hours
Category Man-Hours Cyber-70 Analog.
* Airborne Computer Software 69,284 395 32
* CCLS Factory Checkout Software 85,863 13 658
* CCLS ETR Checkout Software 8,580 
---
* FAP Checkout Software 33,166 6 231
Totals 196,893 414 921
Notes:
a. Airborne computer software costs include support to software checkout
activities listed.
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b. Above data reflect D-i software costs through delivery (DD-250) of
the first D-IA and D-IT vehicle. Final flight program adjustments and
flight support activities at ETR are not included.
2. Mission Costs for Airborne Computer Software
Computer Hours
Man-Hours (Cyber-70)
Low High Low High
Planetary Mission
* First flight 4,800 10,000 26 69
* Follow-on flight 1,100 2,200 6 18
Orbital Mission
* First flight 3,500 8,100 20 53
* Follow-on flight 500 1,100 1 2
Notes:
a. Low and high values shown reflect limits of program complexity,
based on past experience.
D. Titan IIIE (Non-recurring)
A limited review was conducted for the Titan IIIE engineering anal-
ysis effort performed in support of the Titan/Centaur vehicle integration
and mission support tasks. The Titan/Centaur integration tasks include
trajectories, aerodynamics, venting, propulsion, staging, environmental
stability, propellant and stability analysis.
Man-hours 74,000 hours
Computer hours 400 hours
E. Titan IIIE (Recurring) First Mission
The mission peculiar engineering analysis includes trajectory and
performance, aerodynamic, propulsion, flight control, integrated loads,
stability and range safety analysis.
Man-hours 25,600 hours
Computer hours 300 hours
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We trust,...t hese data will be helpful to you in your current study.
Andrew J. Sto an
Manager, Titan/Centaur Project Office
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APPENDIX C
APOLLO/SKYLAB
MANPOWER, COMPUTER TIME REPORT
The following attachments have been provided by The Inter-
national Business Machines Corporation, Houston, Texas, in response to
a request for historical records related to the NASA Mission Control Cen-
ter. These records represent one of the few available for distribution and
provide a valuable insight into the level of support required for highly com-
plex: manned space operations. Use of the data is limited because the
records are not traceable to an initial set of requirements. However,
IBM has prepared a brief description of the scope of effort involved which
provides a frame of reference for interpreting the level of effort and com-
puter time shown. The data may therefore be useful for future efforts
addressing software development and recurring costs, especially as related
to flight operations support or Mission Control Center activities. It was
therefore felt advisable to include the information provided for reference
purposes.
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APOLLO/SKYLAB
MANPOWER, COMPUTER TIME REPORT
05/15/74
International Business Machines Corporation
1322 Space Park Drive
Houston, Texas 77058
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Attached is the history of the manpower and computer time for Apollo and
Skylab
Attachment 1 shows the manpower expended by month in thousands of hours.
Attachment 2 contains the parameters necessary to convert hours to equiva-
lent man years and equivalent man months. Man hours expended has been
broken into three major categories:
o hours expended on Apollo programming systems
o hours expended on Skylab programming systems
o hours expended on Non Mission related activities
No attempt has been made or should be made to pro-rate the Non Mission
hours to Apollo or Skylab programming because of the change of responsi-
bilities in the Engineering and Operations categories between Apollo and
Skylab. Caution should be used when interpreting the manpower for Apollo
during 1971 and 1972 for the following reason. Manpower expended against
Apollo during the maintenance period was exceptionally low. Though a
large number of people was required in order to maintain competence and
coverage of these large systems, these people were able to spend a signifi-
cant portion of their time working on Skylab thus reducing the charges to Apollo.
Attachment 3 contains the computer time expended by month and is also
broken down into the same three major categories as was above with man
hours. Because of a unique characteristic of the OCCURS System, a sig-
nificant amount of computer time was charged to utility programs. For con-
venience this time has been pro-rated between Apollo and Skylab in order to
determine the total computer time expended for Apollo Programming and for
Skylab Programming.
IBM's responsibility in support of the Mission Control Center RTCC con-
sisted of the development, coding and validation of software operations on
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the five IBM 360-75 computers used in the RTCC with two exceptions; com-
munications network interfaces, which were managed by Univac and LMSC,
and programming of a subsidiary CDC computer which served as a data
base storage unit. The IBM effort reported in the following tables included
the major portion of the software development and recurring support costs
for the RTCC. As such, it represents a reasonable base for projecting
future levels of support for large complex programs, similar to Apollo and
Skylab. In addition, to IBM's effort, other Fontractors also supported the
RTCC. Philco-Ford was responsible for all control and display hardware
and overall operational support which included contracted support from
CDC, Univac and LMSC. However, the principal effort regarding software
development was performed by IBM.
The IBM effort included the development of all software for mission opera-
tions control, simulator operations, support of the Real Time Operating
System (RTOS), activity scheduling, General Software Support Computing,
and earth resources interactive processor operations, as well as general
computer operations support. On Apollo four of the five computers were
primary with the fifth held in reserve. On Skylab four computers were used.
One computer was dedicated to data storage functions for incoming experi-
ment data. A second computer was used for retrieval of information from the
mass data storage. The third was dedicated to the "Activity Scheduling Pro-
gram" and the fourth to Simulation and Earth Resources. In general, each
computer was capable of containing 1.1 million instructions of code and 4
million words of data storage.
As a result of the complex nature of the programs required for the Apollo and
Skylab programs, it is recommended that further information regarding the
data of this appendix be referred directly to IBM, Houston.
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RTCC MANPOWER CY 70 (thousands of hrs) 1965
J F M A M J J A S O N D TOTAL
APOLLO
ALSEP
Mission 13.9 12. 6 15. 2 27.2 68.9
Checkout 1.4 1. 9 2. 1 5.4 10.8
GSSC 4.6 5.4 5.5 14.4! 29.9
RTOS 4.8 4.9 5.4 10.7 25. 8
Sys Anal 1.4 1.4 1. 7 2. 5 7. 0
Total 26.1 26.2 29.9 60.2 14Z.4
SKYLAB
Mission
Checkout
GSSC
RTOS
Sys Anal
Terminal
Total
NON - MISSION
Project Off. 4.0 3.4 4.1 7.5 19.0
Tech Serv 2.7 2.9 3.3 7.5 14.9
Engineering 4.7 5.0 5.5 7.5 22.7
Math 1. 0 .6 .7 1.4 3.7
Maint and Op 12. 9 13.0 14.3 18.0 58.2
Earth Res
SLS
Total 25.3 24.9 27.9 41.9 118. 5
RTCC MANPOWER CY 70 (thousands of hrs)1966
J F M A M J J A S 0O N D TOTAL
APOLLO
ALSEP
Mission 3.8 16.6 23.1 21.3 24.3 30.0 23.3 24.9 30. 1 25.0 23.8 36.5 282.7
Checkout - 3.9 4.7 3.7 4.0 4.4 3.6 3.7 4.8 4.4 3.8 5.3 46. 3
GSSC .2 7. 6 9.9 9.5 11.6 14.4 11.7 12.9 16.5 14.4 14.0 19.1 141.8
RTOS 5.0 7.4 7.7 6.3 7.3 7.6 6.5 6.5 7.4 6.1 5.0 8.2 81.0
Sys Anal 1.4 1.6 2.2 2.0 2.0 2.3 1.7 2.4 2. 9 2.3 1.8 2. 9 25.5
Total 10. 4j 37.1 47.6 42. 8 49.2 58,7 46 8 504 61.7 52 2 48. 4 72, O 577. 3
SKYLAB
Mission
Checkout
GSSC
RTOS
Sys Anal
Ter rninal
Total
NON -MISSION
Project Off. 0. 5 3.8 3.7 3.7 2.2 3. 6 2.7 5.0 6.6 5.6 3.4 6. 1 46.9
Tech Serv 2.5 3.3 4.0 2.9 3.5 4.0 3.5 4.6 4.6 3.5 3.0 5.1 44. 5
Engineering 4. 1 6.0 8.2 6.3 5.6 6.2 4.1 5.5 6. 1 5. 1 4. 1 5.9 67.2
Mvlath - .8 1. 1 .9 1.0 1. 1 .8 .9 1.9 .9 .6 1. 1 11.1
Maint and Op 10.3 14.6 17.9 15.3 17.4 20.8 18.5 20. 3 23. 1 20.2 15. 1 28. 5 222.0
Earth Res
SLS
-ta1 17.4 28. 5 34. 9 29. 1 29.7 35. 7 29.6 36.3 42 3 35.3 26.2 46. 7 391.7
RTCC MANPOWER CY 70 (thousands of hrs) 1967
J F M A M J J A S O N D TOTAL
APOLLO
ALSEP
Mission 27.8 29.6 35.4 31.3 30.9 34.8 26.2 29.7 43.0 31.2 28.7 33.8 382.4
Checkout 4.0 4. 6 5. 5 5. 3 4. 2 5.5 4.4 4.0 5.8 4.3 .3 4. 6 52. 5
GSSC 14. 4 15. 2 19.7 16.6 15.9 16.6 13.7 15.3 18.5 15.8 6. 2 17.4 185. 3
RTOS 6. 2 6.1 7.3 6.4 6.5 7. 1 6. 2 8.4 10.5 8.7 8.2 9.4 91. 0
Sys Anal 1.6 2.5 2.9 2. 8 2.9 2. 9 2.8 3.4 3.9 2.9 2.8 3. 5 34. 9
Total 54.0 58.0 70.8 62.4 60.4 66.9 53.3 60.8 81.7 62.9 46.2 68.7 746.1
SKYLAB
Mission
Checkout
GSSC
RTOS
Sys Anal
Terminal
Total
NON - MISSION
Project Off. 4.3 6.7 8.8 7.3 6.8 6. 3 4.6 5. 1 6.5 5. 1 5.3 5.4 72.2
Tech Serv 3. 0 3.6 4.5 3.6 3.6 4. 4 3.6 3.9 3.7 3. 5 3.4 3. 9 44. 7
Engineering 6. 0 5.5 5. 8 4.5 4.3 3.8 4.0 3. 5 4. 9 4. 9 4.5 5. 2 56.9
Math .8 .8 1.0 .7 1.0.1 .7 .7 .9 .8 .6 .7 9.8
IMaint and Op 16. 4 6.5 24.4 18.5 18.2 20. 8 18. 5 19.0 20.9 16.5 15.0 19. 5 214. 2
Earth Res
SLS
Total 30. 5 23.1 44.5 34.6 33.9 36.4 31. 4 32. 2 36.9 30.8 28.8 34. 7 397. 808 -8. -4 7
RTCC MANPOWER CY 70 (thousands of hrs) 1968
S F M A .M J J A S O0 N D TOTAL
APOLLO
ALSEP 
. 7 1.4 1.2 1.3 .6 1.0 1.9 1.8 2. 3 2.6 14.8
Mission 28.1 30. 1 38.7 28.5 32,1 33.4 26,7 30.3 20,3 30.2 27.4 29.7 355.5
Checkout 3.7 4.7 5.6 4.0 4.4 5.3 3,9 4.2 5.9 4.9 5.3 8.8 60.7
GSSC 14.8 16.4 19.6 15.1 16.3 17;3 13.3 14.7 17,1 14.9 14.1 15.6 189.2
RTOS 7.8 9.2 11.7 8.6 9.5 10.3 8.2 9.8 11.2 10.2 9.9 11.1 117.5
Sys Anal 3.6 3.8 4.7 3.9 3.8 4.4 3.4 5.0 5.7 5.1 4.7 5.2 53.3
Total 58.0 64.2 81.0 61.5 67.3 72.0 56. 1 65.0 62.1 67.1 63.7 73.0 791.0
SKYLAB
Mission
Checkout
GSSC
RTOS
Sys Anal
Terminal
Total
NON -MISSION
Project Off. 4,6 5.3 7.3 5.3 5.9 7.6 5.6 6.3 7.2 6.0 5.3 6.3 72.7
Tech Serv 2.9 3.3 4.3 3.3 3.2 4.1 3.8 4.0 4.5 3.9 3.5 4.3 45.1
Engineering 5.2 5.5 7.3 4.3 5.2 5.2 4.3 5.2 6.0 7.7- 8.1 8.8 72.8
2\Math .7 .8 .9 .5 .7 .6 .4 .5 .5 .4 .4 .5 6.9
Maint and Op 15. 1 16.8 21.8 15.4 17.8 21.2 16. 2 23. 2 22.6 20.1 18.3 23.0 231.5
Earth Res
SLS
Total 28.7 31.7 41.6 28.8 32.8 38.7 30.7 39.2 40.8 38.1 35.6 42.9 429.0
RTCC MANPOWER CY 70 (thousands of hrs) 1969
J F M A M J J A S 0 N D TOTAL
APOLLO
ALSEP 2.3 2.3 4.6 3.6 3.7 4.8 3.4 3.2 4.1 3.3 2.9 2.9 41.1
Mission 21.7 26.4 30.8 21.1 23.1 24.2 18.3 17.7 19.7 16.0 16.5 17.4 252.9
Checkout 5.1 5.3 7.3 5.1 4.9 4.5 2.8 3.2 3.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 49.8
GSSC 12.6 14.9 17.9 12.7 14.3 15,0 8.8 10.3 12.4 9.6 8.7 9.6 146.8
RTOS 8.3 10.7 12.5 8.2 8.0 9.7 6.5 7.0 8.2 6.7 6.9 6.9 99.6
Sys Anal 4.4 5.2 5.3 3.5 4.0 4.1 3.0 4.,1 4.2 3.4 2.9 2.3 46.4
Total 54.4 64.8 78.4 54.2 58.0 62.3 42.8 45.5 52.1 41.6 40.6 41.9 636.6
SKYLAB
Mi ssion
Checkout
GSSC
RTOS
Sys Anal
Terminal
Total
NON -MISSION
Project Off. 4.7 6.1 7.7 5.3 6.1 6.7 5.0 5.5 6.7 5.2 5.1 3.2 67.3
Tech Scrv 2.9 3.6 4.8 2.9 3.0 3.6 2.7 6.6 3.9 2.7 2.7 2.9 42.3
Engineering 4.2 5.4 4.7 4.5 4.5 4.1 2.5 2.9 3.9 1.3 3.9 4.5 46.4
Math 
.5 .4 .4 .3 .3 .4 - .4 .2 .2 .2 .2 3.5
Maint and Op 13.8 17.9 22.4 16.0 17.7 18.1 9.6 17.6 17.3 12.5 13.4 14.7 191.0
Earth Res
SLS
Total 26. 1 33.4 40.0 29.0 31. 6 32.9 19.8 330 32.0 21, 9 25. 3 25. 5 350.5
RTCC MANPOWER CY 70 (thousands of hrs) 1970
J F M A M J J A S O N D TOTAL
APOLLO
ALSEP 2. 0 2.7 3.1 2.5 2.2 Z2.2 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.7 2.0 25.0
Mission 10,8 15.0 19.8 16.1 15.4 17. Z2 5.8 7.1 9.0 8.4 7.5 7.7 139.8
Checkout 1.8 2.2 2.4 2.0 2.5 3.5 2.7 2.7 2.8 1.4 1.7 2.0 27.7
GSSC 6.5 8.4 9.9 7.6 7.1 8.0 5.9 7.2 8.6 6.8 7.0 6.5 89.5
RTOS 4.5 6.3 7.7 6.6 6.3 6.9 3.9 4.2 Z 5.4 5.0 4.7 5.0 66.5
Sys Anal 1.5 2.0 2.1 1.8 1.7 1.8 .7 .6 .9 .8 1.0 1. 1 16.0
Total 27.1 36.6 45.0 36.6 35.2 39.6 20.6 23.5 28.4 24.0 23.6 24.3 364.5
SKYLAB
Mission 
.9 1.1 1.5 1.8 1.5 1.6 8.4
Checkout 
.3 .6 1.3 1.2 3.2 1.2 7.8
GSSC .7 .5 .8 1.6 1.9 2.6 8.1
" RTOS 
.6 1.1 1.6 1.3 1.4 1.6 7.6
Sys Anal 
.7 1.2 1.8 1.3 1.4 1.7 8.1
Terminal 3,8 4.1 5.3 4.7 6.4 5.9 30.2
Total 7.0 8.6 12.3 11.9 15.8 14.6 70.2
NON -MISSION
Project Off. 3.5 4.0 3.9 3.0 4.0 4.0 2.6 2.6 3.1 1.3 2.3 2,3 36.6
Tech Serv 1.9 2.1 3.0 2.4 1.0 2.3 1,4 1.8 1.6 1.3 1.2 1.6 21.6
Engineering 3.0 4.1 5.5 3.7 3.1 3.4 2,, 1 2.6 3.8 3.1 3.2 6.4 44.0
Math .2 .1 
.3
Maint and Op 9.4 12.3 14.8 12.0 10.0 13.3 3.7 10.1 13. Z2 11.3 11.4 20.2 Z 141.7
Earth Res
SLS 
.5 1.0 1.2 .8 1.1 1.4 6.0
Total 18.0 22.6 27.2 21.1 18.1 23.0 10.3 18.1 22.9 17.8 19.2 31.9 250. Z2
RTCC MANPOWER CY 70 (thousands of hrs) 1971
J F M A M J J A S O N D TOTAL
APOLLO
ALSEP 1.6 2.1 2.4 1.8 2.0 1.6 1.1 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.1 1. 3 19.3
Mission 5.6 7.2 7.4 5.1 5.4 5.6 3.8 3.9 3.0 2.7 3.2 3.2 56.1
Checkout 1.6 2.6 3, 1 1.6 1.8 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 .9 18 8
GSSC 4.4 5. 2 5.9 3.9 3.8 2.5 1.4 1.1 1.8 1.6 .9 1. 1 33.6
RTOS 3.6 5.3 6,8 4.6 5.9 3.2 2.0 2.0 1.6 1.4 1.4 2.5 40.3
Sys Anal 1.0 1.4 1.8 1.4 1.4 1.0 .7 .5 .4 .5 .2 .1 10.4
Total 17.8 23.8 27.4 18.4 20.3 15.2 10.2 10.1 9.5 8.7 8.0 9.1 178.5
SKYLAB
Mi ssion 1.5 2.2 4.4 4.3 6.8 7.8 7.1 7.3 10.5 8.7 8.9 7.9 77.4
Checkout .6 .6 .9 .6 1.0 .9 .9 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.6 12.8
GSSC 2.1 3.9 5.5 4.5 6.0 8.1 7.2 8.1 9.2 7.5 8.2 9.0 79.3
RTOS 1. 1 1.5 1.8 1.5 3.0 5.5 5.9 6.5 9.1 7.4 8.0 10. 8' 62.1
Sys Anal 1.3 1.7 2.1 1.4 1, 5 2.2 1, 9 2,3 2.7 2.5 1.3 2.7 23.6
Terminal 4.3 6.9 8.6 6.6 8.3 10.1 8.5 9.6 11.5 10. 7 10.5 9.9 105.5
Total 10.9 16.8 23.3 18.9 26.6 34.6 31.5 35.3 44.6 38.2 38.1 41.9 360.7
NON - MISSION
Project Off. 1.6 2.4 3.4 2.1 2.4 2.6 2.2 3.7 2.2 1.4 1.5 1. 7 27.2
Tech Serv .9 1.3 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.8 2,2 18.5
Engineering 2.2 2.8 2.9 2,0 2.1 2.2 1.3 1.7 1.6 2.0 2.0 2.1 24.9
Math
Maint and Op 8.8 13.0 14.4 8 6 12. 7 12.3 9.3 10.3 11. 1 10.6 9.5 6. 2 126.8
Earth Res .1 .5 .7 1.0 .9 1, 1 1.7 6.0
SLS 1.0 1,2 1.5 1 1 1.6 1.6 1.3 1,3 1.3 1.3 1,3 1.3 15.8
Total 14.5 20,7 23.9 15,3 20.2 20.4 16.1 19.2 18.8 17.7 17.2 15,2' 19.2
RTCC MANPOWER CY 70 (thousands of hrs) 1972
J F M A I J J A S O N D TOTAL
APOLLO
ALSEP 
.8 1.0 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.3 .9 1.1 1.1 .6 .8 .7 11.8
Mission 1.8 1.9 2.4 2.3 1.5 1.0 .9 1.2 1.5 1.6 1.6 2.5 20.2
Checkout .6 .8 1.2 .9 .8 .9 .7 .8 .9 .6 .7 .8 9.7
GSSC .8 1.1 1.0 .5 .4 ,2 .3 .6 .7 .1 .3 .1 6.1
RTOS .9 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.1 .6 .4 .5 .5 .5 .4 .6 10.4
Sys Anal .2 .2 
.4
Total 5.1 6.5 7.6 6.5 4.9 4.0 3.2 4.2 4.7 3.4 3.8 4.7 58.6
SKYLAB
Mission 6.7 11.2 14.1 10.7 11.7 14.3 9.7 12.6 16.4 14.0 14.8 17.2 153.4
Checkout 1. 1 2.0 2.9 2.4 2.4 2.7 1.9 2.3 3.2 2.5 1.7 1.4 26.5
GSSC 5.8 8.0 9.8 8.1 9.1 10.9 8.1 9.0 10.8 8.3 8.1 9.6 105.6
RTOS 6.6 9.7 12.9 9.6 10.8 12.8 9.0 10.4 12.2 9.8 10.4 11.0 125.2
Sys Anal 1.8 2.6 3.7 2.5 2.6 3.1 .2.3 2.6 2.9 2.2 2.2 2.5 31.0
Terminal 8.3 11.2 14.5 12.4 12.3 15.9 11.1 12.1 16.9 15.4 18.2 20.4 168.7
Total 30.3 44.7 57.9 45.7 48.9 59.7 42. 1 49.0 62.4 52.2 55.4 62.1 610.4
NON - MISSION
Project Off. .8 1.3 1.6 1.1 1. 1 1.4 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.0 .9 .9 13.3
Tech Serv 1.4 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.9 1.7 1.7 2.6 1.7 1.9 1.9 1.1 20.8
Engineering 1.4 1.9 2.0 1.6 1.9 2.0 1.0 1.6 1.7 1.5 1.2 1.6 19.4
,IMath
!M\aint and Op 3.4 4.7 5. 9 4. 9 4. 6 5. 1 4. 2 4. 5 5.2 4.3 6.3 9.5 62.6
Earth Res 1.3 2.5 3.6 3.2 3.5 4.4 3.3 3.9 4.5 3.5 3.6 3.6 40.9
SLS .5 .7 .5 .4 .3 .3 . .4 .5 .3 .5 .6 5.0
To:ai 8.8 12.8 15.3 12.7 13.3 14.9 112 14.0 14.8 12.5 14.4 17.3 162.0
RTCC MANPOWER CY 70 (thousands of hrs) 1973
J F M A M J J A S O N D TOTAL
APOLLO
ALSEP
Mission 1.5 1.5
Checkout .2 .4 .3 .1 .2 .2 1.4
GSSC
RTOS
Sys Anal
Total .2 .4 .3 .1 .2 1.7 2.9
SKYLAB
Mission 9.2 13.1 17.9 14.0 13.7 13.3 11.2 12.3 14.2 11.8 11.7 11.8 154.2
Checkout .5 .8 1.0 .6 .8 .9 .4 .4 .4 .2 .4 .3 6.7
GSSC 5.3 7.4 9.0 6.5 6.1 3.4 4.3 4.1 4.8 4.0 3.5 3.3 61.7
RTOS 5.9 8.7 11..8 8.4 7.9 8.7 5.2 6.3 6.5 5.2 4.8 5.5 84,9
Sys Anal 1.5 2.3 2.8 2.4 2.1 2.0 1.3 1.2 1.6 1.2 1.0 1.0 20.4
Terminal 11.7 19.0 26.6 21.9 20.2 18.4 11.0 12.0 14.8 11.4 8.7 6.5 182.2
Total 34.1 51.3 69.1 53.8 50.8 46.7 33.4 36.3 42.3 33.8 30. 1 28.4 510.1
NON - MISSION
Project Off. .2 .9 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.2 .8 1.1 1.2 1.0 .7 .9 11.6
Tech Serv 1. 1 1.7 2.4 2.7 2.7 2.8 1.9 1.7 1.9 1.8 1.7 2.8 25.2
Engirieering 
.3 .3 .5 .3 .3 .3 .1 .2 .3 .3 .3 .3 3.5
Math
Maint and Op 2.4 6.4 6.3 5.2 7.3 4.4 6. 2 4.7 5.5 5.4 2.9 3.6 60.3
Earth Res 2. 0 1.7 2.0 1.5 1.9 4.6 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.4 2.5 2.8 28.6
SLS .4 .6 .7 .5 .4 .5 .2 .3 .4 .4 .4 .5 5.3
Total 6. 4 11.6 13.2 11.3 13.8 13.8 11.4 10.4 11.9 11.3 8.5 10.9 134. 5
Attachment 2
Hourly conversion factors
o 1800 hours equals one equivalent man year
o Conversion to equivalent man month
Month Hours
January 100
February 140
March 170
April 140
May 140
June 170
July 140
August 140
September 170
October 140
November 140
December 210
Total
Average 150
C-14
COMPUTER TIME (hrs) 1965
J F M A M J J A S O N D TOTAL
APOLLO
Mission 27 249 456 531 404 1667
ALSEP
GSSC 11 355 418 371 569 1724
CPS 9 153 176 495 523 1356
Sys Anal 1 2 7 21 31
T otal 47 758 1052 1404 1517 4778
SKYLAB
Mission
Terminal
GSSC
CPS
C) Sys Anal
ul To tal
NON- MISSION
M&S 2 26 29 89 72 218
Proj Mgmt 9 12 9 12 42
Engineering
Total 2 35 41 98 84 260
TOTAL 49 793 1093 1502 1601 5038
M & S UTIL
ProRate Apollo
Tot Prog-Ap,
ProRate Skylab
Tot Prog-Sky
COMPUTER TIME (hrs) 1966
J .F MA M J J A S O N D TOTAL,
APOLLO
Mission 429 481 676 809 1100 1388 1426 1632 1695 1850 1683 1565 14734
ALSEP
GSSC 778 617 924 941 925 1048 1012 1067 1037 1107 980 987 11423
CPS 880 753 781 805 846 943 801 937 601 623 523 445 8938
Sys Anal 3 0 3 3 5 51 44 4 5 1 8 2 129
Total 2090 1851 2384 2558 2876 3430 3283 3640 3338 3581 3194 2999 35224
SKYLAB
Mis sion
Terminal
GSSC
CPS
C) Sys Anal
, Total
NON- MISSION
!M&S 159 145 135 126 124 262 128 132 227 172 161 161 1932
Proj Mgmt 10 21 22 20 12 11 18 37 37 26 14 13 241
Engineering
Total 169 166 157 146 136 273 146 169 264 198 175 174 2173
TOTAL 2259 2017 2541 2704 3012 3703 3429 3809 3602 3779 336c 3173 37397
MI & S UTIL
ProRate Apollo
Tot Prog-Ap
ProRate Skylab
Tot Prog-Sky
COMPUTER TIME (hrs) 1967
J F M A M J J A S O N D TOTAL
APOLLO
Mission 1780 1716 1782 2142 2119 2192 2033 1585 1800 1604 1233 1484 21470
ALSEP
GSSC 1216 1087 990 1043 1123 1060 1106 1103 1171 1058 578 824 12359
CPS 460 368 339 247 392 148 319 249 246 401 191 365 3725
Sys Anal 20 92 101 160 199 159 132 144 108 103 54 98 1370
Total 3476 3263 3212 3592 3833 3559 3590 3081 3325 3166 205E 2771 38924
SKYLAB
Mission
Terminal
GSSC
CPS
n Sys Anal
Total
NON- MISSION
M& S 183 144 161 191 232 251 295 282 219 115 97 93 2263
Proj Mgmnt 17 14 13 11 4 8 13 17 9 8 6 13 133
Engineering
Total 2001 158 174 202 236 259 308 299 228 123 103 106 2396
TOTAL 3676 3421 3386 3794 4069 3818 3898 3380 3553 3289 2159 2877 41320
IM & S UTIL
ProRate Apollo
Tot Prog-Ap
ProR.ate Skylab
Tot Prog-Sky
COMPUTER TIME (hrs) 1968
__J _ F __ __ _ A. __ _ J __ __ __ _O N D TOTAL
APOLLO 
.
Mission 1678 1802 1716 1690 1917 1845 1817 1824 1648 1890 1705 1469 21001
ALSEP 6 19 27 82 134
GSSC 1005 958 1097 994 1113 987 1115 1122 1025 1190 1005 999 12610
CPS 408 643 773 585 654 721 699 676 502 560 517 463 7201
Sys Anal 120 169 157 166 177 161 95 209 135 169 137 121 1816
Total 3211 3572 3743 3435 3861 3714 3726 3831 3316 3828 3391 3134 42762
SKYLAB
Mission
Terminal
GSSC
CPS
C) Sys Anal
00 Total
NON- MISSION
M&S 112 153 150 111 100 135 155 188 201 143 130 56 1634
Proj Mgmt 13 13 12 23 23 29 30 30 44 35 48 19 319
Engineering 47 19 66
Total 172 166 162 134 123 164 185 237 245 178 189 75 2019
TOTAL 3383 3738 3905 3569 3984 3878 3911 4068 3561 4006 3569 3209 44781
, & S UTIL
ProRate Apollo
Tot Prog-Ap,
ProRatc Skylab
Tot Pro- Skv
COMPUTER TIME (hrs) 1969
J F M A M J J A S O N D TOTAL
APOLLO
Mission 1683 1455 1266 1376 1082 1056 764 690 647 725 487 615 11846
ALSEP 172 185 206 264 266 395 180 157 201 148 116 103 2393
GSSC 873 796 867 1002 951 666 360 536 553 538 440 487 8069
CPS 361 233 352 386 358 420 276 273 207 220 242 151 3479
Sys Anal 157 116 101 93 227 113 39 58 60 54 35 25 1078
Total 3246 2785 2792 3121 2884 2650 1619 1714 1668 1685 1320 1381 26865
SKYLAB
Mission
Terminal
GSSC
CPS
Sys Anal
Total
NON- MISSION
M&S 133 103 98 148 192 279 224 326 246 240 189 220 2398
Proj Mgmt 31 26 24 19 29 35 23 25 26 36 36 53 363
Engineering
Total 164 129 122 167 221 314 247 351 272 276 225 273 2761
TOTAL 3410 2914 2914 3288 3105 2964 1866 2065 1940 1961 1545 1554 29626
M & S UTIL , 85 134 100 150 469
ProRate Apollo 
_ 85 134 100 150 469
Tot Prog-Ap. 3246 2785 2792 3121 2884 2650 1619 1714 1753 1819 1420 1531 27334
ProRate Skylab
Tot Prog-Sky
COMPUTER TIME (hrs) 1970
J F M A M J A s N D TOTAL
APOLLO M
Mission 550 485 502 427 451 476 418 436 565 537 479 474 5800
ALSEP 115 83 57 52 50 54 92 76 46 68 2c  36 758
GSSC 428 401 377 463 529 503 454 371 354 331 248 158 4617
CPS 138 142 119 164 174 248 157 137 129 160 192 183 1943
Sys Anal 33 30 3 2 2 1 31 18 39 49 41 39 288
Total 1264 1141 1058 1108 1206 1282 1152 1038 1133 1145 989 890 13406
SKYLAB
Mission 1 1 7 0 1 1 11
Terminal 59 48 41 35 41 42 266
GSSC 6 8 18 32
CPS 2 2
O Sys Anal 1  4 5
o Total 60 49 48 41 51 67 316
NON- MISSION
M&S 184 171 172 182 134 150 155 171 168 276 262 311 2336
Proj Mgmt 32 28 36 48 49 65 50 70 50 52 4C 15 535
Engineering 27 6 44 2 5 2 86
Total 216 199 208 230 183 215 232 247 262 330 307 328 2957
TOTAL 1480 1340 1266 1338 1389 1497 1444 1334 1443 1516 1347 1285 16679
M & S UTIL 13M & S UTIL 150 139 137 132 149 140 130 132 214 172 139 1766
ProRate Apollo 132 150 139 137 132 149 133 124 127 207 164 129 1723
Tot Prog-Ap 1396 1291 1197 1245 1338 1431 1285 1162 1260 1352 1153 1019 15129
ProRate Skylab 7 6 5 7 8 10 43
Tot Prog-Sky 67 55 53 48 59 77 359
COMPUTER TIME (hrs) 1971
J F M A M J J A S O N D TOTAL
APOLLO
Mission 574 400 567 545 367 310 213 180 221 225 286 147 4035
ALSEP 39 55 62 68 50 32 56 38 54 38 26 22 540
GSSC 238 238 .349 321 304 232 166 149 179 131 87 99 2493
CPS 113 133 194 221 184 200 111 134 121 129 121 51 1712
Sys Anal 52 89 106 47 44 37 4 15 10 8 1 3 416
Total 1016 915 1278 1202 949 811 550 516 585 531 521 3 22 9196
SKYLAB
Mission 12 20 41 12 27 49 47 57 110 166 167 121 829
Terminal 32 42 44 42 22 20 21 38 53 85 107 74 580
GSSC 40 36 150 71 104 156 256 318 344 398 377 345 2595
CPS 6 48 124 179 147 138 137 297 1076
S Sys Anal 2 22 38 72 67 53 108 82 444
Total 86 98 235 125 159 295 486 664 721 840 896 919 5524
NON- MISSION
M&S 367 236 323 342 378 329 459 436 474 549 500 615 5008
Proj Mgmt 11 10 8 7 8 7 7 7 7 13 7 8 100
Engineering 5 4 4 4 18 9 0 21 0 0 11 3 79
Total 383 250 335 353 404 345 466 464 481 562 518 626 5187
TOTAL 1485 1263 1848 1680 1512 1451 1502 1644 1787 1933 1935 18167 19907
M & S UTIL 215 120 195 188 235 211 270 276 313 322 448 563 3356
ProRate Apollo 198 108 165 170 201 155 143 121 140 125 165 146 1837
Tot Prog-Ap 1214 1023 1443 1372 1150 966 693 637 725 656 686 468 11033
ProRate Skylab 17 12 30 18 34 56 127 155 173 197 283 4,17 1519
Tot Prog-Sky 103 110 265 143 193 351 613 819 894 1037 1179 13136 7043
COMPUTER TIME (hrs) 1972
J F M A M J J A S N D TOTAL
APOLLO
Mission 163 117 145 77 94 115 182 151 147 137 48 13 1389
ALSEP 30 24 40 61 68 68 31 35 22 3 382
GSSC 102 99 62 44 29 19 35 51 21 38 5 3 508
CPS 72 83 55 53 28 9 4 25 2 3 66 400
Sys Anal 10 4 14
Total 347 303 292 198 191 204 289 295 201 213 141 19 2693
SKY LAB
Mission 187 232 242 231 421 261 355 378 506 771 485 342 4411
Terminal 119 158 238 256 487 488 534 419 561 918 661 560 5399
GSSC 553 294 294 230 361 324 538 442 386 431 254 195 4302
CPS 379 227 238 184 455 407 338 387 252 247 186 160 3460
Sys Anal 105 62 40 30 42 35 32 17 17 26 19 32 457
Total 1.343 973 1052 931 1766 1515 1797 1643 1722 2393 1605 1289 18029
NON- MISSION
M&S 857 732 728 559 815 482 467 390 264 363 292 187 6136
Proj Mgmt 5 3 8 5 6 1 5 2 35
Engineering 7 1 5 9 4 6 2 34
Total 869 735 737 569 830 487 472 392 264 363 298 189 6205
TOTAL 2559 2011 2081 1698 2787 2206 2558 2330 2187 2969 2044 1497 26927
M & S UTIL 772 673 679 526 782 462 424 379 259 361 288 180 5785
ProRate Apollo 159 160 148 92 76 55 59 58 27 30 23 3 890
Tot Prog-Ap. 506 463 440 290 267 259 348 353 228 243 164 22 3583
ProRate Skylab 613 513 531 434 706 407 365 321 232 331 265 177 4895
Tot Prog-Sky 1956 1486 1583 1365 2472 1922 2162 1964 1954 2724 1870 1466 22924
COMPUTER TIME (hrs) 1973
J F M A M J J A S O N D TOTAL
APOLLO
Mission 21 21 12 9 7- 5 1 1 8 17 1 103
ALSEP
GSSC 4 5 2 3 7 9 30
CPS 2 2
Sys Anal6 14
Total 23 21 12 9 11 10 9 3 11 30 10 149
SKYLAB
Mission 446 455 369 268 106 86 183 48 56 106 26 16 2165
Terminal 994 934 1057 1270 566 374 627 361 324 320 79 22 6928
GSSC 433 303 269 193 93 76 97 25 10 11 5 ;1 1516
"CPS 252 198 220 218 111 79 81 48 67 64 90 1"2 1440
) Sys Anal 24 32 34 42 18 11 11 8 7 23 11 4 225
Total 2149 1922 1949 1991 894 626 999 490 464 524 211 55 12274
NON- MISSION
M&S 399 313 334 312 169 111 171 82 104 209 101 69 2374
Proj Mgmt
Engineering
Total 399 313 334 312 169 111 171 82 104 209 101 69 2374
TOTAL 2571 2256 2295 2312 1074 747 1179 575 579 763 322 124 1497
M & S UTIL 389 310 260 302 123 94 12,7 65 88 150 79 50 2037
ProRate Apollo 4 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10
Tot Prog-Ap 27 24 14 10 11 10 9 3 11 30 10 0 159
ProRate Skylab 385 307 258 301 123 94 127 65 88 150 79 50 2027
Tot Prog-Sky 2534 2229 2207 2292 1017 720 1126 555 552 674 290 105 14301
THE AEROSPACE CORPORATION
EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION LIST
(REFERENCE: COMPANY PRACTICE 7-21-1)
REPORT TITLE
Operations Analysis (Study 2. 1) Shuttle Upper Stage Software Requirements
REPORT NO. PUBLICATION DATE SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
ATR-74(7341)-4 15 July 1974 Unclassified
MILITARY AND GOVERNMENT OFFICES I ASSOCIATE CONTRACTORS AND OTHERS
(NOTE: SHOW FULL MAILING ADDRESS; INCLUDE ZIP CODE, MILITARY OFFICE SYMBOL, AND "ATTENTION" LINE.)
NASA Scientific & Technical
Information Facility
P. O. Box 33
College Park, Maryland 20740 (3)
NASA - Headquarters
Washington, D. C. 20546
V. Huff, Code MTE (50)
R. R. Carley, Code MTE (2)
Dr. J. W. Wild, Code MTE (1)
New Technology Representative,
Code KT (1)
NASA
Mr. Duncan Collins
P. O. Box 92960
Worldway Postal Center
Los Angeles, CA 90009
Building 120, Room 1406B
AFR 80-45 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT X'D BELOW APPLIES OB. DISTRIBUTION LIMITED TO U. S. GOV'T AGENCIES ONLY.
[ NO DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT
(Classified documents only) (Reason)
OTHER REQUESTS FOR THIS DOCUMENT(Date statement applied)
A. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; 
(Date statemen
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED MUST BE REFERRED TO (Controlling DOD office)
APPROVED BY DATE
fOR THE AEROSPACE CORPORATION)
APPROVED BY DATE
(FOR COGNIZANT A- OTFICE) (SYMBOL)
IF LIST COMPRISES TWO OR MORE SHEETS, COMPLETE
THIS SIGNATURE BLOCK ON LAST SHEET ONLY SHEET OF, _
